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Abstract
Consider a society where all agents initially play fair and one
agent invents a cheatingstrategy such as doping in sports. Which
factors determine the success of the new cheating strategy? In order
to study this question we consider an evolutionary game with local
information. Three factors determine the imitation dynamics of the
model: the location and the type of the innovator, the distribution of
types, and the information available to the agents. In particular we
nd that the economy is more likely to end up in a state where all
agents cheat if the innovator is of low type or when the agents are
maximally segregated.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we consider an evolutionary game where agents can either
play fair or cheat. We want to identify the determinants that eventually
lead to an absorbing state of the imitation dynamics in which all agents use
the cheating strategy when initially all agents but one play fair. We are
interested to identify the role of heterogeneity and the role of information for
this process.
One application we have in mind is doping in sports.1 There are two
important factors that determine the spread of performance enhancing drugs.
First, for athletes it is di¢ cult to obtain information since their use is illegal.
Consequently, information about a new drug spreads through word-of-mouth
communication, respectively it is only shared among athletes who trust each
other.2 Second, athletes have di¤erent talents and so in equilibrium doping
a¤ects their winning probabilities di¤erently.
We capture these aspects by considering an evolutionary game with local
information and asymmetric contests. In this game in each period a nite
number of innitely lived agents are matched pairwise to play a 2 2 stage
game. In each stage game, the agents compete for a prize of value w by
either playing fairor cheat. Agents are of two types: high or low. High
types have a natural advantage over low types: they obtain the prize w with
certainty if they meet a low type and if both use the same strategy. If,
however, a low type cheats against a fair playing high type, he beats the
high type with certainty and receives the prize w. If two players of the same
type meet and if both use the same strategy, they share the prize of value w.
Cheating is costly where the cost c satises 0 < c < w.
There are two stage games. First, if two agents of the same type meet,
the stage game is a Prisoners Dilemma where cheating (playing fair) is the
1Other applications are the spread of crime, corruption, or tax evasion.
2Word-of-mouth communication has been investigated for example by Ahn and Suomi-
nen (2001), although in a quite di¤erent setting.
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dominant strategy if the cost of cheating is su¢ ciently low (high). Second,
if two agents of opposite type meet, the stage game is asymmetric. In this
game, the low types best response is the strategy that is not used by the
high type, and the high types best response is the strategy that the low type
is using.
In each period each agent is matched sequentially to all other agents, i.e.,
agents interact globally. At the end of the period, each agent observes the
strategies and average payo¤s of a subset of all agents, called the informa-
tion set of an agent. In the following period, agents imitate the strategy
with the highest average payo¤ in their information set. To formalize these
sets we locate the agents on a circle as in Ellison (1993). In most parts of
the paper, we focus on two information settings: local information and
global information. With local information agents observe the strategies
and payo¤s of their immediate neighbors on the circle only. If agents have
global information, they observe the strategies and payo¤s of all agents.3
In order to get a benchmark we rst analyze the model when all agents
are identical and so all contests are symmetric. We show that in this case
the information setting has no inuence for the set of absorbing states and
the location of the innovator of the cheating strategy is irrelevant. With
heterogenous agents there are three crucial factors that determine the spread
of the cheating strategy: the location and the type of the innovator of the
cheating strategy, the distribution of types on the circle, and the information
available to the agents. Since many di¤erent distributions of types on the
circle are feasible we focus on two polar cases: maximal segregation and
minimal segregation. In a maximally segregated population high types and
low types are allocated in two clusters so that there are only two players
of each type that have a neighbor of the opposite type. In a minimally
segregated population each agent has two neighbors of opposite type.
3In sports, say tennis, all agents compete against all other agents (global interaction).
Nevertheless, the players - for obvious reasons - only share information about the use of
illegal performance enhancing drugs with their best mates (local information).
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The following results emerge from the model with heterogenous agents
and local information. First, the population is more likely to end up in an
absorbing state where all agents cheat if the innovator is a low type. Second,
if the innovator is a low type, then a minimally segregated population is
more resistant against the cheating strategy than a maximally segregated
population. Third, in contrast, if the innovator is a high type, a maximally
segregated population is more resistant against the cheating strategy than a
minimally segregated population.
Our paper is most closely related to Ellison (1993), Eshel et al. (1998),
and Kandori et al. (1993). Kandori et al. (1993) consider the limiting
distribution when individual mutation rates go to zero for the class of 2 2
stage games. The playersperiod payo¤s are the expected values of the stage
game given the (distribution of) strategy choices of all players. Like Kandori
et al. (1993) we assume global interaction. Ellison (1993) investigates
the limiting distributions and the speed of convergence in a similar model
as Kandori et al. (1993). The crucial di¤erence is that players interact
and obtain information locally. Also, Ellison (1993) focuses on coordination
games.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic
model with homogenous agents. Sections 3 and 4 analyze the model with
heterogenous agents and global and local information, respectively. In Sec-
tion 5, we allow for mutations. Section 6 concludes.
2 Symmetric contests
To derive a benchmark, we assume that in this section agents are homoge-
neous and so all contests are symmetric. We rst describe the stage game,
specify how agents are located and how they adopt or choose new strate-
gies. We then analyze the absorbing strategy states of a dynamic adjustment
process of imitation by N individuals who are distributed along a circle.
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2.1 The Stage Game
We consider a nite population with N > 1 agents denoted by i = 1; :::; N
who live forever. In every period t, the agents are matched to all other agents
to play a 22 stage game. In each stage game, the agents compete for a prize
of value w. The strategy space is fC;Dg, where C stands for playing clean
respectively fair and D for cheating respectively playing doped.Within a
period, a player cannot change his or her pure strategy. Furthermore, mixed
strategies are ruled out.
The payo¤s of the stage game are as follows. If both agents play the
strategy C, each gets w
2
. If both play D, each gets w
2
  c, where c 2 (0; w) is
the cost of cheating. It reects the fact that each agent prefers to obtain the
prize w by playing C rather than by using D. Finally, if an agent plays D
against a clean player, he gets w  c and the clean player 0. Thus, the payo¤
matrix is
A =

w
2
0
w   c w
2
  c

: (1)
The stage game dened in (1) is a Prisoners Dilemma. If c 7 w
2
, D, respec-
tively C, is the dominant strategy.
Agent is period payo¤ in period t, ui;t, is the average payo¤ from the
N   1 matches, i.e.
ui;t(i;t;  i;t) =
1
N   1
X
 i
a(i;t;  i;t)
where i;t is his strategy in period t,  i;t are the strategies chosen by all other
players in period t, and the payo¤s a(:; :) are the corresponding elements of
A in (1).
2.2 Location and Imitation
In order to model incomplete information, we assume that agents are located
on a circle on the positions 1; 2; 3; :::; N . In each period, each agent i obtains
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information about the period payo¤s and the strategies chosen by the agents
ik (modulo N) with k 2 f1; :::; bN
2
cg, where bN
2
c is the largest integer  N
2
.
Dropping the arguments in ui;t(i;t;  i;t), we dene agent is information set
Gi;t(k) as
Gi;t(k) = f(uj;t; j;t) j j = i  k; :::; i+ kg :
If k = bN
2
c, the information set contains information about all agents on the
circle. In this case, we say that agents have global information. If k < bN
2
c
the information set contains not all relevant information. If k = 1, agents
observe strategies and payo¤s of their direct neighbors only. We call this
information setting local information.
We now turn to the question how agents use their information. Following
Eshel et al. (1998), we assume that at the end of every period t, the agents
observe Gi;t(k). In the following period, they play the strategy that gener-
ated the highest average payo¤.4 If they observe but one strategy within
their information set, they play this strategy next period. Let dj;t denote an
indicator variable, which takes the value 0 if agent j plays C and the value
1 if he plays D. Then, if strategies C and D are observed in Gi;t(k), the
observed payo¤ di¤erence i;t is
i;t =
Pi+k
j=i k dj;t  uj;tPi+k
j=i k dj;t
 
Pi+k
j=i k(1  dj;t)  uj;tPi+k
j=i k(1  dj;t)
:
The rst term is the average payo¤ of those agents in the information set
that play D and the second term is the average payo¤ of those agents that
play C. The imitation dynamics satises the following rule.
4Agents who choose strategies according to an imitation rule can interpret the infor-
mation they receive in two di¤erent ways. They can either imitate the most successful
player or the most successful strategy they observe. The former imitation rule is used by
Vega-Redondo (1997) and Alos-Ferrer et al. (2000) and others, the latter e.g. by Ellison
and Fudenberg (1995). We will adhere to an imitation rule of the second kind, where
success of a strategy is measured by its average payo¤.
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Denition 1 The imitation rule is
i;t+1 =
8<:
i;t if i;t = 0
C if i;t < 0
D if i;t > 0
: (2)
if both strategies C and D are observed in Gi;t(k). Otherwise, the agent
continues to use the same strategy. The initial strategy state is k;1 = D and
 k;1 = C for a single k.
The imitation rule implies that if i;t = 0, then i;t+1 = i;t, and for
i;t 7 0, we have i;t+1 = C, respectively D. If a strategy is not observed
in an agents information set, then the agent continues to use the strategy
of the current period. Note that an agents behavior depends solely on the
strategies observed in his neighborhood in the immediate past. That is,
neither the shadow of the future nor the shadow of the more distant past
bear any weight for the choice of strategy (Berninghaus et al. 2003). Finally,
throughout the paper we assume that in the initial period t = 1 one agent
plays k;0 = D, while all other players play  k;0 = C.
We consider an imitation rule and not the best response dynamic because
imitation requires less information; players only need to know the strategies
played and the realized payo¤s of the players in their information sets. This
is particularly relevant for the analysis of cheating since there is no public
information available about the strategies and payo¤s of all agents in the
game. In contrast a best response dynamic requires that the players know
all strategies played in the population. Although our imitation rule seems to
be mechanical, it is appropriate in a situation of cheating where everybody
tries to hide their information.
In the following we will suppress the time index t. We denote by y the
number of agents playing C. This allows us to write agent is payo¤of playing
di 2 f0; 1g as
ui(di; y) =
y   1
N   1
w
2
+ di

N
N   1
w
2
  c

: (3)
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The rst term in (3) is the period payo¤ of an agent who plays C (di = 0).
The second term, which depends only on the population sizeN and the cost c,
is the additional payo¤ for an agent of playing D (di = 1). For homogeneous
agents, (3) implies that an agent i who observes C and D in Gi(k) compares
uj(1; y) and uh(0; y) for some j; h. Thus,i = uj(1; y) uh(0; y) = N(N 1) w2 c.
Note that i is independent of y.5
The model exhibits a nite population e¤ect. Because agents do not play
against themselves, i only approaches the value w2   c as N goes to innity.
Thus, for any nite N and for c 2  w
2
; N
N 1
w
2

, D is a strictly dominated
strategy and nevertheless i > 0 for all i who observe the strategy D in
their neighborhood. That is, despite D being a strictly dominated strategy,
all individuals will end up playing it. The reason for this result is that an
agent playing D is matched to one D player less than an agent playing C.
This increases the benet of using strategy D relative to C.
2.3 Absorbing States
A state is a specication of which agents play C and which play D. At time
t, we describe the state st of the system by an N -tuple
st = (1t; 2t; :::; Nt) 2 S  fC;DgN ;
where S is the set of possible states. If i and j are two possible strategy
states in S, pij is the probability that the imitation rule changes the system
to state j given that i is the current state. The imitation rule in (2) and the
5Note the di¤erence to best response where each player compares its utility for C and
D given the actions of the other players. Suppose y denotes the number of Cs from the
rest of the population, excluding is current action. Then is payo¤ is
ui(di; y) =
1
N   1

y
w
2
+ di(
w
2
  c)

:
However, under local information agents will not be able to calculate this because y is not
known. In contrast, the imitation rule is applicable because agents compare the payo¤s of
their neighbors to their own and choose the strategy according to this.
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non-stochastic nature of the payo¤s result in a deterministic process such
that pij is either 0 or 1. The collection fpijgi;j2S, together with an initial
state, is a Markov process on S. We will refer to this Markov process as the
imitation dynamics of our model.
We are interested in the absorbing states of the imitation dynamics, which
are dened as in Eshel et al. (1998).
Denition 2 A set of states is absorbing if it is a minimal set of states with
the property that the Markov process can lead into this set but not out of it.
An absorbing set of states may contain only one state. If an absorbing set
contains more than one state, the Markov process cycles between the states
contained in the absorbing set.
From now on, we normalize w = 1 (and consequently c is now assumed
to be 2 (0; 1)). Moreover, we concentrate on the polar cases; either the size
of the information set is k = 1 or k = bN
2
c. In the case of local information
(k = 1), each agent observes the strategies and the payo¤s of his direct
neighbors only. In the case of global information (k = bN
2
c), each agent
obtains information about the strategies and the payo¤s of all agents on the
circle.
2.4 The Role of Information
Throughout the paper, we study the spread of D in a population in which in
t = 1 all agents but one play C.
2.4.1 Global Information
If i = C (D) 8i, we denote this state by ~C ( ~D). Under global information,
we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 Let k;1 = D and  k;1 = C. When agents are homogenous
and have global information, then the following is true. If c 7 N
2(N 1) , the
absorbing state ~D, respectively ~C, is reached in period 2.
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The proof is straightforward. If all agents observe the strategies and
payo¤s of all other agents, i is the same for all i = 1; 2; :::; N . Consequently,
when an agent introduces D in period 1, depending on whether i is positive
or negative, all agents will play C or D from period 2 on until the end of
time. This result has been shown to hold by Kandori et al. (1993) in a more
general setting.
2.4.2 Local information
We now consider the case where the agents observe their immediate neighbors
only (k = 1).
Proposition 2 Let k;1 = D and  k;1 = C. When agents are homogenous
and have local information, then the following is true. If c < N
2(N 1) , the
absorbing state ~D is reached in period t = 1 + bN
2
c. If c > N
2(N 1) , the
absorbing state ~C is reached in period 2.
The proof of Proposition 2 is intuitive. If c < N
2(N 1) , i is positive
and all agents that are aware of strategy D imitate it in the following period.
Because k = 1, it takes bN
2
c periods until all agents have learned and adopted
D. If c > N
2(N 1) , i is negative. Consequently, D dies out immediately.
Comparing Proposition 1 with Proposition 2, we see that the size of the
information set only a¤ects the time elapsing until the absorbing state is
reached. In particular, it does not matter which player introduces strategy
D because all agents have the same chances to win for a given strategy. In
the following section we therefore introduce asymmetric contests to see how
this inuences the imitation dynamics.
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3 Asymmetric Contests with Global Infor-
mation
In this section we investigate asymmetric contests, that is, contests in which
agents face di¤erent probabilities to win the prize when playing the same
strategy as in sports where agents with di¤erent talents compete. We rst
consider the situations in which agents are globally informed. In Section 4
we then analyze local information.
3.1 Asymmetric Stage Games
So far we have assumed that if two agents play the same strategy they have
equal probability to win the contest. We now explore the consequences,
if this symmetry assumption is relaxed. In particular we assume  as in
sports that players are of di¤erent talents and hence have di¤erent winning
probabilities.
In order to model this, we assume that agents are heterogenous, i.e., are
either of high type (H) or low type (L). If anH-type is matched to an L-type
and both agents use the same strategy (either D or C), the H-type wins with
certainty. If an H-type is matched to an L-type and only the L-type uses
D, then the L-type wins with certainty. Thus, an L-type prevails over an
H-type if and only if he plays D and the latter plays C. The payo¤matrices
for the asymmetric matches are
AH;L =

w 0
w   c w   c

and AL;H =

0 0
w   c  c

;
where for example AH;L denotes the payo¤s to agent of type H when playing
against an agent of type L. For symmetric matches, the matrices are AH;H =
AL;L = A as in (1).
If two agents of the same type meet, the stage game is a prisoners
dilemma where strategy D is the dominant strategy if c < 1=2 as in the
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symmetric contests. In contrast, if two agents of opposite type meet the
game is asymmetric and has a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.6
We denote by yH the number ofH-types playing C, and by yL the number
of L-types playing C. The numbers of H-types and L-types are denoted by
nH and nL, respectively, with nH + nL = N . The period payo¤s of H-types
and L-types are
uH(di; yH ; yL) =
yH + 2yL   1
2(nH + nL   1) + di

nH + 2nL   2yL
2(nH + nL   1)   c

and (4)
uL(di; yH ; yL) =
yL   1
2(nH + nL   1) + di

nL + 2yH
2(nH + nL   1)   c

. (5)
Note that the second term in (4) depends negatively on yL, while the second
term in (5) depends positively on yH . The additional value of playing D
for H-types (i.e. the second term in (4)) decreases with the number of L-
types playing C. The additional value of playing D for L-types increases
with the number of H-types playing C. This is quite intuitive. Since an
H-type prevails over an L-type playing C with certainty, playing D becomes
less attractive the more L-types play C. On the other hand, because an
L-type prevails over an H-type if and only if he plays D and the H-type C,
D becomes more attractive to L-types as the number of H-types playing C
increases.
3.2 The Role of Information
The imitation rule (2) still applies and we continue to study the spread of D
from an initial situation where all agents but one play C.7 A state where all
agents of the same type play the same strategy is denoted by  !H !L where
6Note that although this game is not a PrisonersDilemma game, it is still a game of
cheating. However, the benet of cheating not only depends on the opponents strategy
but also on his type.
7Note that by using the imitation rule (2), we implicitly assume that an agents type
does not enter the decision to adopt a strategy.
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the rst component means that all H-types play H , the second component
that all L-types play L.
Proposition 3 When agents are heterogenous and have global information,
then if c 7 nH+nL
2(nH+nL 1) , the absorbing state
~D ~D (~C ~C) is reached in period 2.
Proof: The proof is in the Appendix.
According to Proposition 3 when information is global, then it is immate-
rial which type of player innovates D. Intuitively, with global information all
agents have the same information. Consequently, all agents follow the same
decision rule.
From Propositions 2 and 3 we see that heterogeneity does not a¤ect the
absorbing states, if agents have information about strategies and payo¤s of
all agents. In the following we will see that heterogeneity matters if agents
are locally informed about strategies and payo¤s.
4 Asymmetric Contests with Local Informa-
tion
With heterogenous agents and local information, the allocation of types along
the circle matters because it a¤ects the payo¤s of the strategies C and D
which an agent observes in his information set Gi(1). Consequently, in con-
trast to the case with homogeneous agents, Gi(1) does not reveal the true
benet of a strategy to a player. For example, a large payo¤ of a neighbor
can now be due to either the strategy chosen (which is observed) or the un-
observable H-type. In this section, we rst classify the agents according to
their location, which determines the perceived period payo¤ of the strate-
gies C and D. We then investigate the implication of local information and
heterogeneity for the imitation dynamics.
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4.1 The Role of Information
An agent whose immediate neighbors are of the same type is called an interior
player. We denote interior players byHI and LI , respectively. If one neighbor
is an H-type and the other one an L-type, we call the player an edge player
and denote him by HE or LE, respectively. An agent whose two neighbors
are not of his type is called a double-edge player, which we abbreviate by
HEE and LEE, respectively. For the purpose of clarication, we display an
example:
HEHELELILEHEELEEHEHIHIHIHELELEHEHIHELEE
Note that the players at both ends (HE on position 1 and LEE on position N
on the circle) are immediate neighbors. Let us now determine the strategy
choices for the three locations by calculating the decision terms  introduced
above.
Interior Player An interior player has only information about agents of his
own type. Consequently, an interior player only observes di¤erences in payo¤s
if di¤erent strategies have been played. We write these payo¤ di¤erences as
HI (yH ; yL) = uH(1; yH ; yL)  uH(0; yH ; yL) = nH + 2nL   2yL2(N   1)   c(6)
LI (yH ; yL) = uL(1; yH ; yL)  uL(0; yH ; yL) = nL + 2yH2(N   1)   c: (7)
If HI 7 0 (or LI 7 0) , then HI (LI) plays C, respectively D next period.
Edge Player Let us rst consider an edge player of type H. Such a player
has an L-type and an H-type as neighbors, i.e. either LHEH or HHEL.
We concentrate on LHEH because HHEL is analyzed in the same way. An
HE-player faces eight (= 23) possible strategy strings in Gi;t(1). Two strings
are CCC and DDD. In this case the agent does not change his strategy.
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The other six strings are
CDD| {z }
1st
CCD CDC| {z }
2nd
DDC DCD| {z }
3rd
DCC| {z }
4th
: (8)
Consider, for example, the rst term in (8). It means that L plays C, HE
plays D and H plays D. The strategy strings CCD and CDC do not di¤er
with respect to the observed average payo¤s. In either case, the L-type and
one H-type play C, while the other H-type plays D. Similarly, the strategy
strings DDC and DCD yield also the same average payo¤s for D and C,
respectively.
We can summarize the decisions of HE by considering the observed dif-
ferences q
HE
, where the superscript q refers to the rank of the term in (8).
In the Appendix we show that the following ranking holds:
1HE  2HE  HI  3HE  4HE (9)
Thus, if for a clean edge player in a DCC string 4HE > 0, all edge players
and all interior players will play D in the following period.
An edge player of type L has an H-type and an L-type in his information
group. We analyze HLEL because LLEH is analyzed in the same way. The
possible strategy strings in the information group of LE are given in (8). We
show in the Appendix that
4LE  3LE  LI  2LE  1LE : (10)
Next we show that some agents systematically over- or underestimate the
true benet of the cheating strategy D. Recall that an interior player only
observes agents of his own type. Consequently, his decision term LI or HI
reects the true payo¤ di¤erence of the two strategies for his type, i.e. an
interior players assessment of a strategy is not distorted by heterogeneity.
In contrast, according to (9) and (10), edge players systematically over- or
underestimate the payo¤s of C or D to their type as dened below.
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Denition 3 We say that an agent overestimates (underestimates) the pay-
o¤ of strategy D for his type if his decision term  is greater (smaller) than
the decision term of an interior player of his type.
For example, edge players of type H overestimate D whenever their L-
type neighbor plays C, i.e. 1HE  2HE  HI . The reason for this is that
an L-type players payo¤ using C is always zero except when matched to
another L-type player using C in which case his payo¤ is 1=2. In contrast,
an H-type who plays C receives a positive payo¤ when matched to another
H -type or to an L-type using C. Consequently, an edge player of type H
underestimates the benet of strategy C, respectively overestimates D, when
his L-type neighbor plays C.
There are two crucial features of local information. First, certain agents
(edge players and double-edge players) under- or overestimate strategyD, re-
spectively, C. Second, local information permits some agents (interior play-
ers) to observe the true payo¤ di¤erence of the two strategies for his type
as explained above. In contrast, with global information and heterogenous
players no agent ever observes the true payo¤ di¤erence for his type.
Double-Edge Player Finally, let us investigate the behavior of double-
edge players. The information group for an HEE-type and an LEE-type
respectively are composed of the following types:
LHEEL and HLEEH:
Thus, the relevant strategy strings are
DCD| {z }
1st
CCD DCC| {z }
2nd
DDC CDD| {z }
3rd
CDC| {z }
4th
: (11)
In the Appendix we show that the following ranking holds,
3HEE > HI > 
2
HEE and 
2
LEE > LI > 
3
LEE : (12)
Like edge players, double-edge players over- or underestimate the payo¤ of
strategy D to their type.
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4.2 Maximal Segregation
Recall that we want to study how the strategy D evolves in a population in
which initially all players but one play C. The agent who rst plays D is
called the innovator. Two factors determine the spread of D: The allocation
of types along the circle and the location and type of the innovator.
We now consider a distribution of types that we call maximal segregation.
In such a population H-types and L-types are allocated in two clusters as
follows:
HHH:::HHLLL:::LLL
In a maximally segregated population, there are only two edge players for
each type and no double-edge players. In order to simplify the analysis, we
assume that the number of H-types and L-types is the same, i.e. nH = nL =
n = N
2
.
4.2.1 Innovation and absorbing states
As explained above, for each type there are three classes of agents; interior,
edge and double-edge players. Within the same class agents may choose dif-
ferent strategies because they have di¤erent information sets. Consequently,
we have to distinguish the location of the innovator. Innovation by an interior
player has a di¤erent implication for the imitation dynamics than an inno-
vation from an edge player. Moreover, we have also to distinguish among
interior players. An innovation through an interior player who is located
within other interior players has di¤erent consequences than an innovation
from an interior player who is located next to an edge player. We call these
special interior players next-to-edge players and give them the superscript
NE, while we still denote all other interior players by superscript I.
Let the absorbing state ~C ~D (~D ~C ) is identical to ~C ~D (~D ~C) except that
edge players of type L play C or cycle between C and D depending on c and
n.
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Proposition 4 If an L-type introduces D, then for c < 2n
2(N 1) the process
ends up at the absorbing state ~D ~D, for c 2

2n
2(N 1) ;
3n
2(N 1)

at ~C ~D, and for
c > 3n
2(N 1) at
~C ~C.
If an H-type introduces D, then the following is true.
(i) If he is an interior player, then for c 7 n
2(N 1) , the process ends up at the
absorbing state ~D ~D, respectively ~C ~C.
(ii) If he is a next-to-edge player, then for c < n+1
2(N 1) , the process ends
up at the absorbing state ~D ~D, for c 2

n+1
2(N 1) ;
n+2
2(N 1)

at ~D ~C, for c 2
n+2
2(N 1) ;
2n  1
2
2(N 1)

at ~D ~D, and for c > 2n 
1
2
2(N 1) at
~C ~C.
(iii) If he is an edge player, then for c < n+1
2(N 1) , the process ends up at the ab-
sorbing state ~D ~D, for c 2

n+1
2(N 1) ;
n+2
2(N 1)

at ~D ~C, for c 2

n+2
2(N 1) ;
2n  1
2
2(N 1)

at ~D ~D, for c 2

2n  1
2
2(N 1) ;
3n 1
2(N 1)

at ~C ~D, and for c > 3n 1
2(N 1) at
~C ~C.
Proof: The proof is in the Appendix.
Interestingly, the location of the innovator is irrelevant if the innovator is
an L-type. In contrast, if the innovator is an H-type, the location matters.
Finally, the number of agents playing C can decrease in c when the innovation
occurs through an HNE- or an HE-type.
Proposition 5 is illustrated for n = 8 in Figure 1. It displays the role of
the type and the location of the innovator. First, if the cost c is drawn at
random, then the population is more likely to end up in the absorbing state
~D ~D when the innovator is an L-type than when he is an H-type. Second,
among the H-types the location of the innovator is crucial. If the innovation
arises from an HNE- or an HE-type, then again ~D ~D is more likely than if
the innovation arises from an HI-type. In this sense, innovations by edge or
next-to-edge H-types have similar consequences for the imitation dynamics
as those by L-types. Third, the number of agents playing C is non-monotonic
in c.
An interesting case is the limiting case when there is no nite population
e¤ect (n ! 1), depicted in Figure 2. In this case the absorbing state ~D ~C
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Figure 1: Maximal segregation, n = 8.
HI ~D ~D
~C ~C
HNE ~D ~D ~D~C
HE ~D ~D ~D~C
L ~D ~D
c
0 8
30
9
30
10
30
14 1
2
30
23
30
1
disappears. Without a nite population e¤ect, the di¤erence between an
innovation by an HI-type and a HNE- or HE-type can be seen more easily.
For c 2 (1=4; 1=2) innovating HE- and HNE-types infect L-type players,
which does not happen if the innovator is an HI-type. Note that in this
case innovations by L-types or HE- and HNE-types have almost the same
consequences for the imitation dynamics.
4.3 Minimal Segregation of Types
After having characterized the absorbing states when the population is max-
imally segregated, we now consider the polar case of a minimally segregated
population. This means that we look at a population in which types are
located as follows:
HLHLHLHL:::HLHLHLHL:
Evidently, a minimally segregated population consists of double-edge players
only. Consequently, there are only two di¤erent positions where the strategy
D can be introduced, HEE and LEE. Again, we assume nH = nL = n.
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Figure 2: Maximal segregation, innite n.
HI ~D ~D
~C ~C
HNE ~D ~D
HE ~D ~D
L ~D ~D
c
0 1
4
1
2
3
4
1
4.3.1 Absorbing States
Recall that in a maximally segregated population, all agents of the same type
play the same strategy in the absorbing state (with the only exception of
edge-players of type L in some absorbing states). In contrast, in a minimally
segregated population, not all agents of the same type will end up playing
the same strategy. This requires some additional notation.
We denote by ~CyH ~CyL a strategy state where the number of H-types and
L-types playing C is yH and yL, respectively. In such a state, all agents of
either type who play the same strategy are next to each other. Let us dene
y as the greatest nonnegative odd (even) integer smaller than
2c (N   1)  n  1
2
if n is even (odd). Note that if 2c (N   1)   n   1
2
< 0, i.e. c < n+
1
2
2(N 1) , we
have y = 0. In this case, the absorbing state is ~C0 ~C0 where all agents play
D. It is again possible that an absorbing set is attained in which two L-types
cycle between D and C. We denote such an absorbing set by ~CyH ~C

yL
.
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Proposition 5 If an H-type introduces D, then the following is true. If
c <
n+ 1
2
2(N 1) , the absorbing state is
~C0 ~C0, for
n+ 1
2
2(N 1) < c <
2n  1
2
2(N 1) it is
~Cy ~C

y 1,
for 2n 
1
2
2(N 1) < c <
3n 1
2(N 1) it is
~Cn 1 ~Cn, and for c > 3n 12(N 1) , it is
~Cn ~Cn.
If an L-type introduces D, then the following is true. If c < n+
1
2
2(N 1) , the
absorbing state is ~C0 ~C0, for
n+ 1
2
2(N 1) < c <
2n+ 1
2
2(N 1) it is
~Cy ~C

y 1, and for c >
2n+ 1
2
2(N 1) it is
~Cn ~Cn.
Proof: The proof is in the Appendix.
Several comments are in order here. First, in a minimally segregated
population the type of the innovator does not a¤ect the absorbing states
signicantly. It only matters if 2n 
1
2
2(N 1) < c <
3n 1
2(N 1) . In this case, the
absorbing state is ~Cn 1 ~Cn if the innovator is an H-type. Second, if the
innovator infects its neighbors so that strategyD begins to spread, the spread
can be only blocked by H-types. Consequently, in any absorbing state where
both strategies survive and where more than one player adopts strategy D
there will be always one L player more using D than H-players, i.e. the
absorbing state is of type ~Cy ~Cy 1. Third, the absorbing state ~Cn 1 ~Cn is
special because the innovator is a H type, which is not able to infect his
L-type neighbors. Nevertheless, he continues to use D because strategy D
yields a higher payo¤in his information set. Consequently, the initial strategy
string is stationary.
We illustrate Proposition 5 for n = 8 in Figure 3.
Finally, we also consider the limiting case without nite population e¤ect
(n ! 1). With n going to innity, the number y goes to innity, too. So
we cannot indicate the respective absorbing state with y. We use the share
of agents playing C in dependence of the costs c instead. Consequently, an
absorbing state ~C4c 1 ~C4c 1 means that for c = 0:3 one fth (= 4  0:3  1) of
the H-types and one fth of the L-types play C.
From Figure 4 we can see that without nite population e¤ect the type
of innovator is irrelevant. If c < 1=4, then all players will end up using D.
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Figure 3: Minimal segregation, n = 8.
H ~C0 ~C0 ~Cy ~C

y 1
L ~C0 ~C0 ~Cy ~C

y 1
c
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Figure 4: Minimal segregation, innite n.
H ~C0 ~C0 ~C4c 1 ~C4c 1
L ~C0 ~C0 ~C4c 1 ~C4c 1
c
0 1
4
1
2
3
4
1
For 1=4 < c < 1=2, the fraction of H-types and L-types using C is equal
and strictly increasing in c. Finally, for c > 1=2, all agents play C. This
is interesting because with global information in the limiting case when the
number of players is large we get the result that if c 7 1
2
, the absorbing state
is ~D ~D (~C ~C) (see Proposition 3). Thus, local information reduces the spread
of the strategy D if agents are minimally segregated.
4.4 Maximal versus Minimal Segregation
We conclude this section with a comparison of the absorbing states of a
maximally and of a minimally segregated population. For this comparison we
calculate the expected share of agents playing C in the absorbing state when
22
each agent is equally likely to innovate D. We focus on large populations
(n ! 1) such that nite population e¤ects can be neglected. Another
consequence of this assumption is that the role of edge players (of which
there are but two of each type in the maximally segregated population and
none in the minimally segregated population) becomes negligible.
Figure 5 depicts the expected shares of agents playing C in the absorbing
states for maximally and minimally segregated populations. The left-hand
panel displays the shares for both populations when D is introduced by an
H-type, while the right-hand panel displays these shares if innovation occurs
by an L-type.
Figure 5: Comparing maximal and minimal segregation, innite n.
There are two things worth pointing out. First, in a minimally segregated
population the location of the innovator does not matter. Consequently, for
a minimally segregated population the graph depicting the share of agents
playing C (the dotted curves in Figure 5) is identical in both panels. Second,
if the innovator is a low type, then a minimally segregated population is
more resistant against the cheating strategy D than a maximally segregated
population. The reason for this result is that in a minimally segregated
population each low type (including the innovator) is surrounded by two
high types who are less prone to imitate D. In contrast, if the innovator is a
high type, then a maximally segregated population is more resistant against
D than a minimally segregated population. The reason for this result is that
in a maximally segregated population the innovator is again surrounded by
high types which are less prone to imitate D.
Proposition 6 Consider a large population (n ! 1). Then, if each agent
is equally likely to innovate the cheating strategy D, the following is true.
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If c < 2
8
, all agents play D in the absorbing state for both distributions of
types.
If 2
8
< c < 3
8
, more agents play D in a minimally segregated population than
in a maximally segregated one.
If 3
8
< c < 6
8
, fewer agents play D in a minimally segregated population than
in a maximally segregated one.
Finally, if c > 6
8
, all agents play C in the absorbing state for both distributions
of types.
These results follow from Propositions 5 and 6. They are depicted in
Figure 6.
Figure 6: Comparing maximal and minimal segregation, innite n.
For c 2 (3
8
; 6
8
) the minimally segregated population exhibits a higher share
of agents playing C in the absorbing state than the maximally segregated
population. The reason for this is that being located between L-types, the
H-types are able to block the spread of strategy D. However, for su¢ ciently
low cheating costs, i.e. for c 2 (2
8
; 3
8
); the maximally segregated population
exhibits a higher share of agents playing C. The reason is that in a maximally
segregated population L-types never observe D if the innovator is a H-type.
In contrast, in a minimally segregated population, if D is introduced by a
H-type, two L-type will observe it. And since L-types are more likely to
be infected than H-types the population share of agents playing D is larger
with minimal segregation.
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5 Mutations
In this section we introduce mutations. In each period, after imitations
have occurred, each agents strategy changes with a small probability ".8 As
mentioned before, the imitation dynamics is a Markov chain evolving over the
strategy space S. A probability distribution over S in time t is represented
as a row vector  which is an element of the 2N -dimensional simplex. The
simplex N is the set
N =
(
 2 IR2N
 i  0 andX
i
i = 1 for i = 1; 2; :::; 2N
)
:
The process evolves according to t+1 = tP , where P is the transition
probability matrix dened in Section 2.3. Now that agentsstrategies change
with probability " after imitation, the transition probability pij is positive
for all i and j, i.e. the Markov chain is regular. Thus, there exists a unique
probability distribution  2 N such that9
P =  :
The vector  is the unique stationary distribution of the regular Markov
process, which does not depend on the initial probability distribution. The
stationary distribution  is stable, i.e.
lim
t!1
P t =  8  2 N :
>From the law of large numbers for regular Markov chains we have
E
"
1
T
TX
t=1
zi;t
#
! i with zi;t =

1 if st = i
0 otherwise
as T tends to innity.10 Therefore, the probabilities in the limiting distribu-
tion can be interpreted as average share of time the process spends in a given
8See Kandori et al. (1993, p.38) or Ellison (1993, p.1050) for an interpretation of ":
9See e.g. Kemeny and Snell (1960), Theorem 4.1.6.(b).
10See e.g. Kemeny and Snell (1960), Theorems 4.1.6.(a) and 4.2.1.
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state. The transition matrix P (") and the stationary distribution (") de-
pend on ". The stationary and stable probability distribution (") describes
the long-run behavior of the imitation dynamics with mutations. Since we
are interested in the imitation dynamics for small "; we consider the limiting
distribution :
 = lim
"!0
(") :
The limiting distribution , if it exists, depends on the parameter values
fc; ng of our model. Even for very small populations, evaluating  involves
solving a large equation system of 22n variables. Instead of nding  (")
explicitly and taking the limit for " ! 0, we approximate  numerically.
We will describe  for a maximally segregated population and the smallest
population size (n = 5) that provides all relevant positions of innovation (i.e.
HI , HNE, HE, and L) as described previously. Our simulations suggest that
the following results hold.
Conjecture 1 If a population is maximally segregated and the individual
mutation rate " goes to zero, then our simulations indicate the following. If
c < n
2(N 1) , we have Pr(
~D ~D) = 1, for n
2(N 1) < c <
2n 2
2(N 1) then Pr(
~D ~C) = 1,
for 2n 2
2(N 1) < c <
2n+2
2(N 1) , then Pr(M) = 1 whereM =
n
~D ~D; ~D ~C; ~D ~C; ~C ~D; ~C ~D; ~C ~C
o
,
for 2n+2
2(N 1) < c <
3n
2(N 1) then Pr(
~C ~D) = 1, and for c > 3n
2(N 1) , then
Pr(~C ~C) = 1.
We illustrate our conjecture for n = 5 and n ! 1 in the following
Figures.
Figure 7 demonstrates that the absorbing state ~D ~D arising from
c 2

n+2
2(N 1) ;
2n  1
2
2(N 1)

in the model without mutations disappears. Never-
theless, we still observe non-monotonicity because ~D ~D is an element of the
absorbing set M and is played with strictly positive probability.
Again, an interesting case is the limiting case when n ! 1, depicted in
Figure 8.
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Figure 7: Maximal segregation with mutations, n = 5.
~D ~D ~D~C
c
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Figure 8: Maximal segregation with mutations, innite n.
~D ~D ~D~C
c
0 1
4
1
2
3
4
1
For c < 1
4
, the model with mutations and the deterministic model both
give way to the absorbing state ~D ~D. If 1
4
< c < 1
2
, the absorbing state ~D ~C is
reached with probability 1 in the model with mutations. In the deterministic
model, on the other hand, the absorbing state is ~C ~C if the innovator is an
HI-type and ~D ~D otherwise. From this we conclude that our results in the
deterministic model are not robust with respect to mutations. This is not so
surprising, since due to the imitation rule, agents can only imitate strategies
they observe in their information set. Thus, in the absorbing states ~C ~C and
~D ~D, the population is locked in. This cannot occur with mutations. For
1
2
< c < 3
4
, the model without mutations exhibits another lock-in, which
arises if the innovation occurs through an HI- or an HNE-type. For c >
3
4
, the model with mutations and the deterministic model have the same
absorbing state, ~C ~C.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined an evolutionary game where agents can either
play fair or cheat. Our goal was to identify the determinants that eventually
lead a situation where all agents cheat. One application we had in mind was
doping in sports. There are two characteristics that determine the spread
of performance enhancing drugs in sports. First, it is di¢ cult to obtain
information about their use since they are illegal. Second, in equilibrium
doping a¤ects the winning probabilities of the athletes di¤erently. For this
reason we have considered an evolutionary game with local information and
asymmetric contests.
We have studied the imitation dynamics when initially all agents play
fair and one agent invents the cheating strategy and we have focused on two
distributions of types: maximal (equal types are located next to each other)
and minimal (agents have always neighbors of opposite type) segregation.
The following results emerge from the model. First, the population is more
likely to end up in an absorbing state where all agents cheat if the innovator
is a low type. Second, if the innovator is a low type, then a minimally
segregated population is more resistant against the cheating strategy than a
maximally segregated population. Third, in contrast, if the innovator is a
high type, a maximally segregated population is more resistant against the
cheating strategy than a minimally segregated population.
28
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
If the innovating agent is an H-type, the initial numbers of clean agents are
yH = nH   1 and yL = nL. If the innovator is an L-type, these numbers are
yH = nH and yL = nL  1. We rst notice that due to global information we
have that
H(yH ; yL) = L(yH ; yL) :
We therefore drop the type group index of the decision terms.
If the innovation arises from an H-type, the decision term for all agents
is
(nH   1; nL) = uH(1; nH   1; nL)
  (nH   1)uH(0; nH   1; nL) + nLuL(0; nH   1; nL)
N   1 :
From (4) and (5) we get
uH(di; nH   1; nL) = N + nL   2
2(N   1) + di

nH
2(N   1)   c

and
uL(di; nH   1; nL) = nL   1
2(N   1) + di

N + nH   2
2(N   1)   c

, respectively.
Using this information we get
(nH   1; nL) = nL + nH
2(nL + nH   1)   c:
If the innovation arises from an L-type agent, the di¤erence in the average
payo¤s is
(nH ; nL   1) = uL(1; nH ; nL   1)
  nHuH(0; nH ; nL   1) + (nL   1)uL(0; nH ; nL   1)
N   1 :
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From (4) and (5) we get
uH(di; nH ; nL   1) = N + nL   3
2(N   1) + di

nH + 2
2(N   1)   c

and
uL(di; yH ; nL   1) = nL   2
2(N   1) + di

N + nH
2(N   1)   c

, respectively.
Using this information we get
(nH ; nL   1) = nL + nH
2(nL + nH   1)   c:
Note that
(nH ; nL   1) = (nH   1; nL) :
Consequently, the origin of the innovation does not matter if information is
global.
Decision Terms for Edge Players
The decision terms for an edge player of type H are
1HE(yH ; yL) = uH(1; yH ; yL)  uL(0; yH ; yL)
=
nH + 2nL + yH   yL
2(N   1)   c ; (13)
2HE(yH ; yL) = uH(1; yH ; yL) 
1
2
[uH(0; yH ; yL) + uL(0; yH ; yL)]
=
nH + 2nL +
1
2
yH   32yL
2(N   1)   c ; (14)
3HE(yH ; yL) =
1
2
[uH(1; yH ; yL) + uL(1; yH ; yL)]  uH(0; yH ; yL)
=
1
2
nH +
3
2
nL +
1
2
yH   32yL
2(N   1)   c ; (15)
4HE(yH ; yL) = uL(1; yH ; yL)  uH(0; yH ; yL)
=
nL + yH   yL
2(N   1)   c : (16)
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For an edge player of type L we get
1LE(yH ; yL) = uL(1; yH ; yL)  uH(0; yH ; yL)
=
nL + yH   yL
2(N   1)   c ; (17)
2LE(yH ; yL) = uL(1; yH ; yL) 
1
2
[uH(0; yH ; yL) + uL(0; yH ; yL)]
=
nL +
3
2
yH   12yL
2(N   1)   c; (18)
3LE(yH ; yL) =
1
2
[uL(1; yH ; yL) + uH(1; yH ; yL)]  uL(0; yH ; yL)
=
1
2
nH +
3
2
nL +
3
2
yH   12yL
2(N   1)   c ; (19)
4LE(yH ; yL) = uH(1; yH ; yL)  uL(0; yH ; yL)
=
nH + 2nL + yH   yL
2(N   1)   c : (20)
Decision Terms for Double-Edge Players
For a double-edge player of type H the decision terms are
1HEE(yH ; yL) =
nL + yH   yL
2(N   1)   c ; (21)
2HEE(yH ; yL) =
nL +
3
2
yH   12yL
2(N   1)   c ; (22)
3HEE(yH ; yL) =
1
2
nH +
3
2
nL +
3
2
yH   12yL
2(N   1)   c ; (23)
4HEE(yH ; yL) =
nH + 2nL + yH   yL
2 (N   1)   c ; (24)
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and for a double-edge player of type L they are
1LEE(yH ; yL) =
nH + 2nL + yH   yL
2(N   1)   c ; (25)
2LEE(yH ; yL) =
nH + 2nL +
1
2
yH   32yL
2(N   1)   c ; (26)
3LEE(yH ; yL) =
1
2
nH +
3
2
nL +
1
2
yH   32yL
2(N   1)   c ; (27)
4LEE(yH ; yL) =
nL + yH   yL
2(N   1)   c : (28)
Proof of Proposition 4
We accomplish the proof of Proposition 4 in two parts. We rst consider the
absorbing states when an L-type introduces D.
L-type introduces D.
In the following we assume that the innovator is an interior player LI . The
absorbing states are the same when an LNE or an LE innovates D.
(a) If c > 3n
2(N 1) , in the absorbing state all players play C because from
(5) LI (n; n  1) < 0. Consequently, D dies out immediately.
(b) If c 2

2n
2(N 1) ;
3n
2(N 1)

the absorbing state is ~C ~D. This interval
can be divided into two subintervals. First, if c 2

5
2
n 1
2(N 1) ;
3n
2(N 1)

in the
absorbing state all LI play D, and the two LE and all H-types play C.
If c < 3n
2(N 1) , interior players of type L imitate D because LI (n; yL) =
3n
2(N 1)   c > 0. (Note that LI (n; yL) does not depend on yL). At one point
in time, an LE observes D. He adopts it if 2LE(n; yL) =
5
2
n  1
2
yL
2(N 1)   c > 0.
Since2LE depends negatively on yL,
2
LE is increasing when the number of L
I
using D increases. Thus, 2LE(n; yL) is maximal when yL = 2. Consequently,
if
5
2
n 1
2(N 1) c > 0, the edge players of type L never adopt D, and an absorbing
state is reached.
Second, if c 2

2n
2(N 1) ;
5
2
n 1
2(N 1)

, in the absorbing state all H play C, all
LI play C, and the LE cycle between D and C. If c <
5
2
n 1
2(N 1) , an L
E-
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type imitates D. The rst HE-agent observing D has the decision term
4HE(yH ; yL) =
n+yH yL
2(N 1)   c. He adopts D if 4HE(yH ; yL) > 0. Since all
H types still use C we have yH = n. Let us rst assume that c is such that he
does not imitate D. Then, the number L-types adopting D is increasing be-
cause their decision term does not depend on yL. Consequently, yL decreases
to 0 implying 4HE(n; 0) =
N
2(N 1)   c.11 Thus, if 2n2(N 1) < c <
5
2
n 1
2(N 1) all H-
types play C and the LE-types cycle between C andD because1LE(n; 0) < 0
and 2LE(n; 2) > 0.
(c) If c < 2n
2(N 1) , in the absorbing state all players play D. If c <
2n
2(N 1) ,
4HE(yH ; yL) > 0. Then, from (9) all other H-types will also imitate D.
Note that L-types continue to use D because they do not observe strategy
C in their information set anymore. Consequently, in the absorbing state all
players play D.
H-type introduces D.
(i)
If an HI introduces D, we have to consider the intervals c 2

0; n
2(N 1)

and
c 2

n
2(N 1) ; 1

.
(a) If c > n
2(N 1) , then HI (n   1; n) < 0 and D is extinguished in the
second period. The absorbing state is ~C ~C.
(b) If c < n
2(N 1) , then HI (n 1; n) > 0, and the HI that observe D will
play it in the second period. In the following periods, more and more HI will
switch to D since HI is unchanged as long as only H-types observe D. At
some point an HE will observe D. His decision term is 2HE , which from (9),
is always higher than HI (n   1; n). So he will adopt. The next player to
11Note that yL can only become 1 and not 0 if n is even. Start counting outward from
an LI inventing D. Since n is even, it takes an uneven number of periods from the period
the the rst LE observes D until the second LE observes D. As explained in the text, the
LE cycle between C and D for the interval under consideration. Hence the two LE do not
play the same strategies in any given period. This shifts the lower bound of the respective
interval to c 2

2n 1
2(N 1) ;
5
2n 1
2(N 1)

for even n. In the Proposition we state the result for odd
n.
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consider is LE. His decision term is 4LE(yH ; n). He also adopts D because
4LE(yH ; yL) > HI (yH ; yL) > 0. Now all L
I adopt D too, since LI > 0 for
c < n
n(N 1) . The last question we have to answer is whether the decreasing
yH or yL can stop the spreading in either of the two groups. For the H-types
this is not the case because HI is decreasing in yL. For the L-types we nd
that if c < n
2(N 1) , then LI is always positive. Consequently, if c <
n
2(N 1) ,
the absorbing state is ~D ~D.
(ii)
If an HNE invents D, one HI and one HE observe D. For this reason, it is
convenient to divide the proof into three subsections: we consider the cost
intervals

0; n
2(N 1)

,

n
2(N 1) ;
2n  1
2
2(N 1)

, and

2n  1
2
2(N 1) ; 1

separately.
(a) If c < n
2(N 1) , one can show that all decision terms are strictly positive.
Consequently, the absorbing state is ~D ~D.
(b) For n
2(N 1) < c <
2n  1
2
2(N 1) , we nd several absorbing states. We derive
them one by one. In the rst period we have 2HE(n 1; n) > 0 but HI (n 
1; n) < 0. In period t = 2, HE is thus the only agent playing D, since HNE
who invented D abandons it (he decides according to HI ) and HI does not
adopt it. So now LE, HE and HNE face the decision to imitate D or not.
Their decision terms are 4LE , 
2
HE and HI , valued at (n   1; n). With
c 2

n
2(N 1) ;
2n  1
2
2(N 1)

we have
4LE(n  1; n) =
3n  1
2 (N   1)   c > 0
2HE(n  1; n) =
2n  1
2
2 (N   1)   c > 0
HI (n  1; n) = n2 (N   1)   c < 0 :
So we know that in period t = 3 LE as well as HE play D and LI , LE, HE,
and HI have to decide to adopt or abandon D. By looking at these four
decision terms (LI , 3LE , 
3
HE , and HI ) evaluated at (n   1; n   1), it
becomes clear that the process now is not unique for the whole interval of
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c 2

n
2(N 1) ;
2n  1
2
2(N 1)

.
LI (n  1; n  1) = 3n  22 (N   1)   c > 0
3LE(n  1; n  1) =
3n  1
2 (N   1)   c > 0
3HE(n  1; n  1) =
n+ 1
2 (N   1)   c ? 0
HI (n  1; n  1) = n+ 22 (N   1)   c ? 0 :
The HE who has the choice will only adopt D if c < n+1
2(N 1) . In this case,
D will be played by the whole population: all HI and LI have a positive
decision term such that yH and yL decline by one each period. Also the last
two agents confronted with D, HE and LE imitate D, because
2HE(1; 1) =
3n  1
2 (N   1)   c > 0
2LE(1; 1) =
n+ 1
2 (N   1)   c > 0 : (29)
So for n
2(N 1) < c <
n+1
2(N 1) , the absorbing state is
~D ~D.
It is clear that for a slightly higher c, c 2

n+1
2(N 1) ;
n+2
2(N 1)

, D spreads too
in both populations, but once all agents but two play D, LE will not adopt
it, according to (29). Because of
LI (0; 1) =
n
2 (N   1)   c < 0 ;
C will be imitated by the LNE next to LE in the following period, in which
case LE switches toD (the decision term for LE now is3LE , which is positive
for the c under consideration). All L-players but the edge players adopt C
then. The edge players decision term 2LE cannot be negative for the c
under consideration and thus the H-types are cut o¤ the strategy C. For the
interval n+1
2(N 1) < c <
n+2
2(N 1) we thus nd the absorbing state
~D ~C.
35
Rising c again, c 2

n+2
2(N 1) ;
2n  1
2
2(N 1)

, in period t = 4 none of theH-players
will imitate D and it will spread in group L. Once yL is small enough, group
H will adopt strategy D. The absorbing state here is ~D ~D.
(c) If

2n  1
2
2(N 1) ; 1

, we have 2HE(n  1; n) < 0 and HI (n  1; n) respec-
tively. So all players give up D in the second period and the absorbing state
is ~C ~C.
(iii)
If an HE introduces D, an LE and an HI and the introducing HE can decide
to play D or not in the second period. The respective decision terms are
4LE(n  1; n) =
3n  1
2 (N   1)
2HE(n  1; n) =
2n  1
2
2 (N   1)
HI (n  1; n) = n2 (N   1) :
It is convenient to look at the cost intervals

0; n
2(N 1)

,

n
2(N 1) ;
2n  1
2
2(N 1)

,
2n  1
2
2(N 1) ;
3n 1
2(N 1)

, and

3n 1
2(N 1) ; 1

separately.
(a) If 0 < c < n
2(N 1) , the absorbing state is
~C ~C because all decision terms
are positive.
(b) If n
2(N 1) < c <
2n  1
2
2(N 1) then 
2
HE(n 1; n) > 0 and 4LE(n 1; n) > 0,
andHI (n 1; n) < 0. So in the second periodHE and LE only playD. This
situation is what we have analyzed in Part (ii), subsection (b) of this proof.
We can therefore take over these results and conclude the similar dynamics
for this range of the costs.
(c) If 2n 
1
2
2(N 1) < c <
3n 1
2(N 1)) only L
E plays D in the second period. All
LI adopt D in the following because LI is always negative for the given
cost interval. The spread of strategy D among the L-types will not a¤ect
the H-types strategy choice, they keep playing C because 4HE < 0 for the
cost interval under consideration. As discussed before, the LE either cycle
between C and D or play D, the absorbing state for this cost interval is ~C ~D.
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(d) If 3n 1
2(N 1) < c < 1, the strategy D becomes extinct and the absorbing
state is ~C ~C, because all decision terms are negative.

Proof of Proposition 5
We rst assume that an H-type plays D in period t = 1. If 4HEE > 0 he
will keep playing D and his two neighbors adopt D if 2LEE > 0. We have
4HEE(n   1; n) > 2LEE(n   1; n) and so D becomes extinct if c > 3n 12(N 1) .
For 2n 
1
2
2(N 1) < c <
3n 1
2(N 1) the equilibrium is the initial strategy distribution,
because the neighbors of the inventor do not adopt D, but the HEE keeps
playing it.
We focus on c < 2n 
1
2
2(N 1) now. As just seen, in t = 2 only the innovator
HEE and his two neighbors play D. Four players can choose between C and
D now, two HEE (playing C) that have the decision term2HEE and two L
EE
(playing D) that have the decision term 3LEE . Since 
2
HEE(n  1; n  2) >
3LEE(n   1; n   2) and 2HEE(n   1; n   2) > 0, there are two cases to be
distinguished t = 3: either all of them adopt D, or the two HEE adopt D and
the two LEE do not. The two cases will actually lead to the same absorbing
state: the two LEE will have the decision term 1LEE(yH ; yL) in period t = 4
which is greater than 2HEE(yH ; yL) for all yH and yL, so they will adopt D
then. Thus, this second case does not inuence the absorbing state. It is
clear that if the two HEE choose to play D, the LEE will do the same one
period later. We neglect it from now on.
There are only two di¤erent kind of strategy states in this dynamics. The
rst one is of the kind of period t = 3: twoHEE with decision term2HEE and
two LEE with3LEE choose betweenD and C. We call this state L-dominated
because more L-types than H-types play D (to be precise: yL   yH = 1).
Picture period t = 3 to get the intuition. In t = 3, three agents play D, these
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are located as follows:
:::HLHLH| {z }
C
LHL| {z }
D
HLHLHL:::| {z }
C
:
The second kind of strategy state is of the kind of period t = 4: two LEE
with decision term 2LEE and two H
EE with decision term 3HEE have to
decide between the two strategies. We call this state H-dominated because
more H-types than L-types play D (yH   yL = 1).
:::HLHL| {z }
C
HLHLH| {z }
D
LHLHL:::| {z }
C
:
Note that for any positive integer x, 2LEE(x  2; x  1) as well as 3HEE(x 
2; x 1) are larger than2HEE(x; x 1). So if we have reached anH-dominated
state, we will also reach the L-dominated state that features two more L-
types playing D.
We conclude that the absorbing state is reached when 2HEE is negative
(2HEE depends positively on yH). So only an L-dominated state can be an
absorbing state. The interpretation is that it will always be an H-type that
stops the spread of D. An H-type will at one point halt the spread of D
and act as a blocker to the L-types playing C who would adopt D if they
would observe D. The higher c is, the earlier the spread of D is halted, that
means, the less agents use D in the absorbing state. We conclude that there
exist many di¤erent absorbing states, depending on population size N and
the costs c.
We calculate the number of agents playing C in the absorbing state. Since
the absorbing state is L-dominated, we can substitute yL with yH   1.
2HEE =
n+ yH +
1
2
2 (N   1)   c < 0
! yH < 2c (N   1)  n  1
2
:
The solution yH to this inequality must be an odd (even) number if n is even
(odd). This comes from the fact that whenever HEE have the decision term
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2HEE , there is an odd number of H-types playing D. This is because yH
decreases by steps of two.
If an L-type agent innovates D in the rst period, the same arguments
apply.
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